

# Marine Risk Analysis IERRT

PINS Meeting 24 August 2022





































Figure 3.1: Swept paths for vessel departing IOT 6 overlaid on baseline 4 berth proposal

Figure 3.2: Swept paths for vessel departing IOT 6 overlaid on baseline 3 berth proposal













Figure 2.7: Modelled peak spring currents at time of peak ebb tide







ABP Humber provided wind data collected from the Immingham Maritime Control Centre (at a height of 24m) between August 2020 and 2021. The data was analysed by HR Wallingford, as shown in Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13.





Figure 2.12: Wind rose showing distribution and strength of wind at IOH


Figure 2.13: Wind rose showing distribution and strength of wind gusts at IOH



Figure 1.2: Immingham Harbour layout

Source: Google Earth 2021





- Tidal flow model is clearly wrong
- Wind data used is taken from the wrong anemometer


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- Why report in July 2022 for a simulation in 2021?
- Wind sheltering

- Tidal flow model is clearly wrong
- Wind data used is taken from the wrong anemometer
- The use of the DFDS Jinling Class
- Why report in July 2022 for a simulation in 2021?
- Wind sheltering
- How aborts are treated

Run ID	Pilot	Tugs	Vessel	Manoeuvre	Tide/ current	Wind dirn, speed (knots	Outcome	Initial position	Comments and pilot/tug master remarks
34	IC	2 x 70t ASD 70t 2411	237m RoRo	Depart Berth 1	HW-5	SW 30 gusting 35	Pass	Berth 1	Utilised a swing methodology similar to Run 33, though the swing was completed closer to Berth 1/2 jetty. The tugs only assisted in pulling the vessel off the berth as once away from the berth the tide assisted the vessel away to the west. A 62m separation distance from IOT1 dolphins was maintained throughout.
35	IC	16t workboat	104m tanker	Arrival IOT8	HW-5	NE 15	Aborted	IOT3	Vessel successfully turned wide of IOT1, but had picked up speed (4 knots) when coming around and so it was a challenge to maintain distance from Immingham East Berth 1 vessel. Tug secured on port quarter and assisted with push/pull as the vessel straightened up out of the turn, however, the tug was unable to avoid contact with the Immingham East Berth 1 vessel.
36	IC	16t workboat	104m tanker	Arrival IOT8	HW-5	NE 15	Aborted	IOT3	Similar to Run 35 and was aborted before contact would have occurred between the tug and Berth 1 vessel.
37	IC	16t workboat	104m tanker	Arrival IOT8	HW-5	NE 15	Pass	IOT2	Pilot took a more conservative approach (compared with Runs 35 and 36), providing time to line up west of IOT and to reduce speed to below 2 knots before passing Immingham East Berth 1. The subsequent approach was controlled (not requiring tug assistance) and resulted in safely arriving in a berthing position.
38	IC	16t workboat	104m tanker	Arrival IOT8	HW-5	NE 25 gusting 30	Aborted	Min. 12 of Run 37	Tug secured on starboard quarter and provided push assistance as approaching Immingham East Berth 1. This was, however, insufficient to avoid contact with the tug/stern of the vessel. Initial position regarded to be too close to correct and to be revised in the next run.
39	IC	16t workboat	104m tanker	Arrival IOT8	HW-5	NE 25 gusting 30	Aborted	E of min. 12 of Run 37	Initial position revised to further E of previous run providing more clearance from Immingham East Berth 1. Vessel tracked SE towards IOT8, however, contacted the rolling fender at the end of the IOT pier.
40	IC	16t workboat 45t ASD	104m tanker	Arrival IOT8	HW-5	NE 30	Pass	E of min. 12 of Run 37	As run started, 45t ASD secured on starboard beam and the workboat on the starboard quarter. The forward tug (the ASD) started pushing 25 to 50% once S of the pier to keep vessel away from Immingham East Berth 1. Satisfactory berthing manoeuvre.



Overall it should be noted that manoeuvring to and from the new infrastructure is challenging, requiring precise positing of the vessel, tugs and their attitude to the tidal flow and the wind. Mitigating the inherent risk in the manoeuvring operations will require a robust training solution to be in place.

Additional assessment will be required to identify the detail of recommended procedures and limits for all classes of vessel and a wider range of environmental conditions. This will be particularly pertinent to developing appropriate limits for an initial operating capability.




# Navigational Risk Assessment

# Navigational Risk Assessment Software Available

- HAZMAN II
- ORPA
- MarNIS (produced by ABPmer)

#### Methodology


- 1. IMO Formal Safety Assessment standard assessment when assessing risk in a habour environment
- 2. OREI Risk Assessment standard assessment when assessing risk in offshore renewable environment



		Lo	ok up Table - Consequence		
Serial	Negligible (1)	Minor (2)	Moderate (3)	Major (4)	Extreme (5)
People	No Injury	Minor Injury First aid injury, minimal time lost. Temporary impediment, no long term effects.	Serious Injury Medical atension required. Short term lost of time. Partial disability/impediment with medium to long term effects.	Single Fatality Long term loss of time. Long term effects. Also includes permanent/total disability with long term effects.	Multiple Fatalities Multiple long term loss of time and long term effects. Also includes multiple permanent/total disability with long term effects.
Property Damages	£0 - £10000	£10000 - £750000	£750000 - £4 million	£4 million - £8 million	> £8 million
Planet (Enviroment)	None (No incident - or a potential incident/near miss)	No Measurable Impact (An incident or event occurred, but no discernible environmental impact - Tier 1 but no pollution control measures needed)	Minor (An incident that results in pollution with limited/local impact - Tier 1, Harbour Authority pollution controls measures deployed)	pollution control measures from external	Major (Has the potential to cause catastrophic and/or widespread damage - Tier 3, requires major external assistance)
Port reputation	None	Minor (Little local publicity. Minor damage to reputation.	Moderate (Negative local publicity. Moderate damage to reputation.	1	Major (Negative national and international publicity. Major damage to reputation.

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		Lo	ok up Table - Consequence	1	
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	Look up Table - Likelihood			
	Occurance			
Rare	The impact of the risk or hazard is realised but should very rarely occur within the lifespan of the entity.			
Unlikely	The impact of the risk or hazard may occur within the lifetime of the entity but is unlikely.			
Possible	The impact of the risk or hazard could very well occur within the lifetime of the entity without mitigation.			
Likely	It is quite likely that the impact of the risk or hazard will occur throughout the lifespan of the entity without mitigation			
Almost Certain	The impact of the risk or hazard will occur during the lifespan of the entity (multiple times), mitigation is required to reduce it			

#### Hazman II

Rare	1 or more in 10,000 years
Unlikely	1 or more in 1000 years
Possible	1 or more in 100 years
Likely	1 or more in 10 years
Frequent	1 or more in 1 year


5 Α INTOLERABLE (High Risk) Consequence As Low 3 Α As Reasonably 2 R Practice ACCEPTABLE (Negligible Risk) 2 3 5 1 4

## Frequency

#### **Assessed Risk & Controls**

Hazard Baseline Date






#### Most Likely Outcome

Low speed ... collision dislodges tanker from berth causing a tier 3 pollution event, major damage, serious injuries too personnel and locally significant port reputation damage


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#### Worst Credible Outcome

RoRo makes contact with berthed tanker in a significant allision that portholes the tanker leading to a tier 3 possible pollution of the petrochemical leading to a fire that causes significant damage and multiple fatalities. Major international news that significantly effects the ports reputation.





✓ Snap	Worst Credible Frequency	
Frequency	Possible One or more times in 100 years.	3

F5

	Most Likely Consequence	
Environment	Major - Upper Tier 3 Declared	5
People	Moderate (Minor Injuries or One Major)	3
Property	Serious (£1M - 10M)	4
Stakeholders	Serious (£1M - 10M) National Exposure	4

	Worst Credible Consequence		
Environment	Major - Upper Tier 3 Declared	•	5
People	Catastrophic (Mulitple Fatalities)	•	5
Property	Major (£10M +)	•	5
Stakeholders	Major (£10M +) International	•	5

#### **NRA Process Issues**

- •The lack of any involvement from external independent consultants
- •The use of mixed methodology to 'cherry pick' elements favourable to the applicant
- •The decision not to use a recognised Risk Assessment software package
- •Only completing 9 out of 25 risk assessments at the workshop and missing key risks (East Jetty)
- •The decision of choosing not to produce a risk rating but to allow the 'Duty Holder' to decide the acceptable risk level